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Transit: Evaluating the 




This article examines the Canada Line rapid rail transit project in Vancouver, British 
Columbia, a decade after its completion and the 2010 Winter Olympic Games for 
which it was accelerated. The case resides at the intersection of two project classes 
with well-documented patterns of underperformance: transit mega-projects and 
sporting mega-events. Beyond connecting a number of Vancouver 2010 venues, the 
Canada Line is notable for its use of a public-private partnership procurement (PPP) 
model, as well as the significant real estate development seen nearby. In particular, 
the article focuses on outcomes classified under three headings: procurement 
model, community impact, and land use impact. Prior to providing avenues for future 
research, this article finds that while the PPP model avoided substantial cost overrun 
risks, the lucrative operational concession was where the growth coalition pushing 
the project was able to make it sufficiently attractive for private partners, while 
externalizing cost on third-parties.
Keywords
mega-events, mega-projects, public-private partnerships, land use, rapid transit
Introduction
Although mega-events such as the Olympics are perhaps viewed popularly as sporting 
endeavors, in financial terms they may be better thought of as infrastructure programs 
that can shape regional development and impact fiscal health in the longer term. 
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Indeed accompanying related infrastructure costs can frequently exceed the official 
cost of a mega-event several times over (see Agha et al., 2012; Baade & Matheson, 
2016). Even within a larger suite of infrastructure mega-projects that the literature has 
documented as substantially underperforming projections on cost, completion, and 
operation, the Olympics may top the podium.
While urban growth coalitions and proponent governments may argue that the 
mega-event is merely speeding up infrastructure investments that would otherwise be 
made, the hard event deadline can alter and move ahead projects in ways that make 
sense for the event, but may not be ideal for long term regional needs. One frequent 
element of Olympics-related mega-infrastructure is rapid rail transit lines. Despite 
being clearly contemplated as part of the Olympics, rail infrastructure projects are 
viewed by the IOC as “indirect capital costs” and thus often left out of reported Games 
expenditures (Flyvbjerg et al., 2016).
This article evaluates one such rapid rail transit investment linked to the Vancouver 
2010 Olympics, the Canada Line. While work on the Canada Line and other Olympics-
related rapid rail projects typically concentrates on the time leading up to the Games 
period, this study has the benefit of a decade since both the Canada Line’s opening and 
the 2010 Olympics. The longer horizon provides a more complete frame for assessing 
the project under three primary headings: procurement model, community impact, and 
land use impact. After a review of mega-events and urban growth coalitions, rapid rail 
projects and the Olympics, as well as the literature on rail transit project evaluation, 
the article discusses outcomes under the three identified lines of inquiry before offer-
ing lessons for future similar projects.
Mega-Events, Infrastructure, and Urban Growth 
Coalitions
Regime theory argues that the complexities of local politics impact policy through 
brokering, coalition building, and resource sharing between public (elected and 
bureaucratic) and private centers of political and economic influence (Basolo, 2000). 
This extends to competition between different jurisdictions to pursue economic devel-
opment agendas, manifesting in variations of the “growth machine” concept through 
which coalitions of elite local organizations implement self-beneficial urban policies 
while selling these policies as benevolent (Logan & Molotch, 1987).
In the mega-event context, growth coalitions can be driven by national politicians 
and elites aiming to demonstrate their brand on the world stage, while consolidating 
support for a domestic agenda. Sometimes the objective will be to showcase a lesser 
known city in a country, a modern side of an existing hub, increase a tourism profile, 
or more broadly make gains in “soft power” and influence (see Grix & Lee, 2013). 
Domestically, the mega-events can be a political impetus to speed up infrastructure 
investments that will have legacies beyond the event period (Muller, 2017), or as ploys 
by local and sub-federal governments to direct central government investment to par-
ticular regions. 
Sroka 3
A relatively vibrant literature exists on infrastructure investments and legacies in a 
mega-event context. Some focus on directly on infrastructure and cost overruns 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2016; Matheson, 2012), while others discuss event impacts (e.g., 
Andranovich & Burbank, 2011; Fourie & Santana-Gallego, 2011; Maennig & 
Zimbalist, 2012; Preuss, 2015), economics (Baade & Matheson, 2016), or argue that 
mega-events using existing infrastructure can have significant dividends (Gratton 
et al., 2006).
The 2010 Vancouver Olympics were something of a mega-event bookend to Expo 
’86. With both events, a growth coalition of center-right politicians, business leaders, 
and media pushed the events as agents of economic and infrastructure growth that 
would help sell Vancouver as a global city (see Ginnell, 2013; Sant & Mason, 2015; 
Surborg et al., 2008; Sussmann, 2006; Whitson, 2004). The Canada Line is an expan-
sion of the SkyTrain system that originated for the 1986 World’s Fair (the original line 
is the “Expo Line”).
With Vancouver 2010, previous works have addressed Games-related infrastruc-
ture projects in a legacy context (Kaplanidou & Karadakis, 2010; Kidd, 2011; Sant & 
Mason, 2015) as well as the Canada Line subway as a private-public partnership (PPP) 
(Siemiatycki, 2006). Sant and Mason (2015) in particular discussed major capital proj-
ects as one of three frames (along with economic and human impact) used to sell the 
bid and the Games by politicians and Games proponents. However, little has been 
written on the Canada Line in the decade since its opening.
Rapid Rail Infrastructure and the Olympic Games
Olympics-related rapid rail infrastructure can come in the form of light rail, heavy rail, 
and conventional rail: the first being tram-like vehicles within a city but without a 
completely separated right of way, the second typically elevated or underground (often 
electrified “third rail”) trains within a city on their own right of way, and the last cat-
egory representing train connections between cities with more limited stops. Light rail 
was seen in Games such as Calgary, and Salt Lake, while subways or metro projects 
were found in Munich, Montreal, Barcelona, Atlanta, Athens, Torino, Beijing, 
Vancouver, and Rio. Intercity or traditional rail projects accompanied the Olympics in 
Albertville, Nagano, Sydney, London, Sochi, and Pyeongchang.
Games-related intra-city rail connections are most frequently made to connect cen-
tral cities to their airports, or to major sporting clusters. This need to make Games-
related transportation more feasible does not necessarily correspond to the greatest rail 
transportation need in a region, or how transportation dollars would be invested in the 
absence of the Olympics. Thus the value in Olympics-related rail infrastructure is reli-
ant upon prudent planning to ensure that largely temporary Games uses can dovetail 
with existing and longer term transport needs.
In Calgary and Torino, Games-related rail infrastructure has aligned with longer 
term transit priorities. In Rio, Munich, and Vancouver, rail construction has skipped 
other projects that were previously deemed to be a greater priority. Some hosts have 
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seen the Games serve as a transformational agent for transit systems. For instance the 
substantial metro expansion associated with Tokyo 1964 (International Paralympic 
Committee, 2014) was eclipsed by Beijing, with four metro lines attributable to accel-
erated construction and planning schedules following its successful bid for the 2008 
Olympics (Fallows, 2011).
Evaluating Rapid Rail Transit Projects
The literature highlights a range of means for evaluating prospective rapid transit proj-
ects. These include traditional cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, multi-
criteria analysis, regional economic impact studies, and environmental impact 
assessment (De Brucker et al., 2011). The two most relevant and common are likely 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and multi-criteria analysis (MCA). The former compares 
relative marginal costs and benefits and can focus on attributes such as value for 
money, ridership, and travel times in different potential alignments. Regarding land 
use impacts, some CBA studies have questioned transport policy merits (Hatzopoulou 
& Miller, 2009; Loo & Cheng, 2010) and noted that a CBA may not be appropriate for 
some projects (Beuthe et al., 2000; Ustaoglu et al., 2016).
In part a response to CBA limitations, MCA can be viewed as a wider aggregation 
of cost-benefit analyses concerning both different variables and stakeholders as per-
taining to a broader range of quantitative and qualitative criteria (De Brucker et al., 
2011). This method has been critiqued primarily on qualitative weighting and subjec-
tivity, as well as data mixing (Ustaoglu et al., 2016). Despite framing pitfalls, De 
Brucker et al. (2011) argue that MCA can be beneficially used through a stakeholder-
centered or institutionalist approach to examining transit projects.
A number of works have evaluated relationships between the urban built environ-
ment and public transit with established projects. Many studies can be seen as under-
standing these relationships through measures focused on some combination of 
density, diversity of land use, design (such as street network), as well as destination 
accessibility, distance to transit, and destination management (Cervero & Kockelman, 
1997; Ewing & Cervero, 2010). In particular, the comprehensive meta-analysis of 
Ewing and Cervero (2010) found that transit use was most strongly related to proxim-
ity and street network design, with land use a secondary influence.
Some project specific case studies are also useful. Pan et al. (2014) found that in 
cities as divergent as Shanghai and Houston, rapid rail lines have significant positive 
impacts on nearby residential real estate prices. This is supported by works showing 
that rapid rail stations are likewise positive indicators of property values (Chen et al., 
1998; Debrezion et al., 2007; Hess & Almeida, 2007). However Zhong and Li (2016) 
argue that there is a premium for multi-family property values relative to single-fam-
ily, as well as for heavy rail over light rail. Kilpatrick et al. (2007) highlight that with-
out direct access, proximity to a transit corridor can actually have negative effects on 
adjacent property values.
The literature on evaluating projects through cost-benefit has also highlighted the 
trend toward using PPPs in the pursuit of value for money as well as managing the 
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risks of cost and time overruns (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003, 2009). Flyvbjerg (2007) found 
that some 90% of transit projects failed to meet ridership projections. Although PPPs 
may bring higher baseline costs than public finance, these are potentially made up for 
through the lifecycle and the transfer of underperformance risk to private partners 
(Siemiatycki & Friedman, 2012). Still, the effectiveness of the theory may depend on 
the parameters of a particular project (Hodge et al., 2018). Indeed, the impact of any 
transit line is linked to other parts of the network that may be outside of the private 
partner’s control and lead to tension between partners (Siemiatycki, 2011).
There is less written directly on community impacts of rapid rail transit. Instead 
these considerations are often addressed in MCAs. Of note though, is an analysis of 14 
American metro areas by Baker and Lee (2019) that did not find that light rail stations 
lead to localized gentrification. Additionally, in an analysis of light rail in Hamilton, 
Ontario, Topalovic et al. (2012) argued that the project should be considered a “cata-
lyst for social change; improving the health, environment, sustainability and connec-
tivity of the community.” Even if community impact of rapid transit is not the central 
focus of many academic works, this is a frequent frame for government analyses (e.g. 
Lichfield, 2005; Topalovic et al., 2012).
Flyvbjerg’s work on mega-project underperformance is a particularly useful lens 
for this study. The overarching theory from several articles centers on over-optimism 
and strategic misrepresentation by key actors as explaining underperformance in terms 
of cost and completion overruns, as well as failure to meet operating projections 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2009). The phenomena is highlighted as being especially strong in 
the rail transit and mega-event realms (Flyvbjerg, 2007; Flyvbjerg et al., 2016). 
However Flyvbjerg’s work is focused on more traditional measures of cost-benefit, 
such as financial cost, operating revenue and usage, as well as completion timeline, 
leaving something of a gap where considering performance variables such as land use 
and community impact.
Method and Materials
The primary research issue is evaluating the outcomes of the Canada Line 10 years 
after its opening and the 2010 Olympic Games. From here, the objective is to contrib-
ute to broader literature on performance of rapid rail projects built to accompany 
mega-events. Centered on a retrospective, single case study method, there are three 
primary lines of inquiry: procurement model, community impact, and land use impact.
Documents were collected from government, media, industry, legal, and academic 
sources using a snowball technique from a combination of search engine terms, gov-
ernment websites, and databases until over 30 search term combinations pertaining to 
the Canada Line and the three headings of inquiry (procurement model, community 
impact, and land use impact) were exhausted. The collected documents were then 
initially reviewed for their prospective relevance as (1) independent sources and (2) 
as holding reference to other potentially relevant sources. The sources harvested from 
the second step were then examined through the same two-step process, repeated 
until no new documents were found. The initial review included examining abstracts, 
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introductions, conclusions, and bibliographies, as well as searching for key terms 
within the text. Subsequently, the full body of relevant documents remaining after the 
two-step initial review were analyzed and synthesized across source headings as 
appropriate.
Government documents included feasibility and impact reports, annual and quar-
terly financial reports, contracts, regional council proceedings, property assessments, 
bylaws, planning, and development materials, as well as other documents from the 
Ministry of Transportation and relevant local governments. Where appropriate, docu-
ments were requested through the British Columbia Freedom of Information and 
Personal Privacy Act. The media review included articles from local, regional, and 
national newspapers, magazines, business reporters, and television stations. Secondary 
interviews or quotes from key actors were especially of interest. Legal sources cen-
tered on statute, case law, and law firm materials. Industry documents included real 
estate and construction trade publications. Unless otherwise specified, Canadian dol-
lars are used.
Canada Line Overview
The Canada Line is a 19 km, 16 station heavy rapid rail line connecting downtown 
Vancouver to the suburb of Richmond, with a 4 km spur to the airport. Prompted by 
the provincial government’s desire to connect the airport and downtown prior to the 
Olympics as well as over $400 million of federal funding contingent on that objec-
tive, the then RAV (Richmond-Airport-Vancouver) line jumped the regional transit 
priority queue over a SkyTrain expansion to the northeast. Indeed the line ended up 
being a crucial Games transport spine linking three competition venues, the primary 
stadium for ceremonies, athletes’ village, and international broadcast center, with the 
province insisting on an “Olympic Village” station. However, there were serious 
questions as to whether this was the appropriate regional transit priority in the medium 
and longer term.
The initially $1.6 billion RAV line was intended as a PPP to be jointly funded by the 
federal and provincial governments, the regional transit authority (TransLink), and the 
Vancouver Airport Authority, with costs above $1.4 billion covered by a private part-
ner. The private component came through the then provincial government’s interest in 
the PPP model for infrastructure mega-projects and the need to create a majority on the 
TransLink board. The board, with votes from several regional mayors, twice voted 
against the RAV line, but the third attempt was successful based upon the premise of 
capped public costs that would not further deplete funding for the northeastern 
Millennium Line expansion (Chan, 2014) (Figure 1). 
Four consortiums bid on the Canada Line, with the winner led by Quebec construc-
tion/engineering firm SNC Lavalin. SNC was chosen over Bombardier, the manufac-
turer of Vancouver’s then two existing SkyTrain rapid transit lines. This saw the 
Canada Line use a different rail technology and lose the benefits of interoperability 
and a shared maintenance facility. Unlike with the original Expo Line, the federal 
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government did not make its funding contingent on using Bombardier technology 
(Figure 2). 
The concession agreement attempted to allocate risks to the partners best equipped 
to manage a particular risk (Canada Line Rapid Transit Inc., 2006). The design-build-
finance-operate-maintain PPP saw a 35 year concession provided to the consortium-
owned InTransit BC. The consortium exclusively took on the risks of construction 
costs, inflation, delay, municipal permitting, tunneling, civil works integration, sys-
tems performance, maintenance, and operating cost, and performance (2006). A 
wholly owned subsidiary of SNC Lavalin, ProTrans BC, receives the operational 
subcontract from InTransit. The publicly owned Canada Line Rapid Transit 
Corporation (a joint venture between the province and TransLink) retained risks for 
right of way and land acquisition, contaminated soils, archaeological discoveries, and 
public protests. Permitting costs, utility relocation, and force majeure were risks 
shared between InTransit and the public corporation, while insurance costs and rider-
ship revenue risks were shared between InTransit and TransLink. With ridership rev-
enues, TransLink retained 90% of the performance risk, reflecting that in an integrated 
transit system, TransLink was better situated to modify fares, bus routes and service 
to direct and maximize Canada Line ridership. Yearly concession payments to 
Figure 1. Canada Line and the SkyTrain system.
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InTransit are based 70% on service availability (trains per hour), 20% on service 
quality, and 10% on volume (Figure 3). 
PPP Outcomes
The PPP model delivered significant protection from cost overrun. InTransit paid 
$720 million of the $2.05 billion in capital costs, framed as “capital at-risk” against 
future underperformance. This is substantially offset by the significant yearly pay-
ments InTransit is entitled to from TransLink under the concession for operation and 
maintenance, as well as performance metrics and inflation. InTransit’s $720 million at 
risk is intended to be repaid over concession’s life through meeting performance tar-
gets. The payments ranged on a generally upward trend between $90 million and 
$107 million between 2010 and 2014, and were projected to run between $120 million 
and $132 million in the 2020 to 2024 period (TransLink, 2014, 2020). A $90 million 
yearly payment starting in 2010 adjusted for 3% inflation over 30 years equates to a 
future value of $4.28 billion, or a 2010 present value of $1.76 billion. Even if the true 
operational and maintenance costs for InTransit are estimated at up to 50%, the con-
cessionaire is still recovering a significant profit on their capital.





Land acquisition cost and 
schedule
Canada Line Rapid 
Transit Inc. (CLRT)
CLRT Construction
Municipal and regulatory 
permitting, cost
CLRT/InTransit BC CLRT Construction
Municipal and regulatory 
permitting, delay
InTransit BC CLRT Construction
Undisclosed environmental or 
archaeological liabilities
CLRT CLRT Construction
Cost of design build packages InTransit BC CLRT Construction
Cost of construction InTransit BC Contractors Construction
Construction inflation InTransit BC Contractors Construction
Construction delay InTransit BC CLRT Construction
Utility relocation CLRT/InTransit BC CLRT Construction
Changed ground condition 
(tunnels and foundations)
InTransitBC CLRT Construction
Design integration InTransit BC CLRT Construction
Integration between civil works 
and systems
InTransit BC CLRT Construction
Public protest, legal action, 
embargo or blockade
CLRT CLRT Construction, 
Operating
Reasonableness of behaviour of 
agencies and cities
CLRT CLRT Construction, 
Operating
Force Majeure CLRT/InTransit BC CLRT Construction, 
Operating




Condition of civil assets InTransit BC CLRT Construction, 
Operating
Operating performance InTransit BC CLRT Operating
Operating costs InTransit BC TransLink Operating
Maintenance costs InTransit BC TransLink Operating
Useful life of trains and other 
systems
InTransit BC TransLink Operating
Ridership revenues TransLink 90%/ 
InTransit BC 10%
TransLink Operating
Figure 3. Canada Line risk allocation.
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Compared to maintenance and operational costs for the three publicly run SkyTrain 
lines using Bombardier technology, the concession payment is over twice as expensive 
on a per track kilometer or per boarding basis (Chan, 2017b), and three times as expen-
sive on an operating cost per capacity kilometer basis (Translink, 2018a). Much of this 
can be accounted for by the return on capital provided to the private partner (Canada 
Line Rapid Transit Inc., 2006). Beyond capital return, there are likely scale economies 
with the 60 km of Bombardier technology SkyTrain, consistent with findings in the rail 
transit literature (see Savage, 1997). Indeed the failed Bombardier bid for the Canada 
Line was partially premised on efficiencies gained from a common maintenance facil-
ity and rolling stock, but these advantages were not allowed to be used in the award 
criteria (Chan, 2016).
The procurement included extensive outside expert analyses comparing the two 
options. While the traditional procurement model had a lower gross cost, once a risk 
premium was added, the 50th percentile outcome saw the PPP model return a savings 
of C$92 million in 2003 dollars at a 6% discount rate (Canada Line Rapid Transit 
Inc., 2006). The PPP model significantly narrowed the band between projected 5th 
and 95th percentile construction costs and ridership risks relative to the public sector 
alternative.
Risk shifting has been accompanied by the Canada Line consistently receiving 
higher customer survey ratings on safety, cleanliness, and service frequency measures 
(TransLink, 2017, 2018a). Likewise, the Canada Line opened 2 months ahead of 
schedule in September 2009. The line was estimated to need in the range of 100,000 
daily riders to break even and there was skepticism that it would meet its targets. 
However the line almost met its 2013 projections within its first year of operation in 
2010, and has since seen over 145,000 daily riders (TransLink, 2018b).
Instead of falling short of ridership projects like the previous SkyTrain expansion, 
the Canada Line is already seen as underbuilt and lacking capacity to deal with future 
demand. Again this is reflective of the financially driven incentives of the design-build 
specifications—the Canada Line was built with platforms half the length of the other 
SkyTrain lines in the region to cut capital costs. For the life of the concession, the 
realistic option will be to increase the number of trains, although this is seen as only 
sufficient for the next 15 years of growth (Chan, 2017b). If the public had retained 
operations, the government may have seen the cost of lengthened platforms as a wor-
thy long term investment years before the asset is returned to full public control.
Community Impact
The Canada Line saw major community impact issues, which may both be some-
what associated with the scope of geography touched by the project, as well as the 
private sector incentives the PPP model brought. Most notably, although the original 
public discussion focused on bored tunneling along Cambie Street in Vancouver, 
outside of downtown, the tunnelling became almost exclusively cut and cover. 
Whereas with a bored tunnel, a tunneling machine will descend from a small foot-
print and excavate without disturbing the surface outside of its initial footprint, cut 
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and cover closes a block of roadway at a time: a trench is created, tunnel laid, and 
the trench is covered back up.
This highly disruptive method became most controversial along a 12 block com-
mercial strip known as the Cambie Village. Here the cut and cover excavation 
destroyed the walkable character of the shopping district, causing some businesses to 
close and many others to sustain significant losses. The provincial finance minister at 
the time, who happened to represent the local constituency, testified in a later lawsuit 
that “the construction was far more disruptive than anyone had anticipated, not only 
because it was done with a cut and cover method as opposed to the promised bored 
tunnel but also because pledges to only disrupt individual businesses for a maximum 
of 3 months were never kept” (Wintonyk, 2012). In reality some businesses experi-
enced 18 months of cut and cover.
While the district has fully recovered its vibrancy and appeal in the decade since the 
Canada Line’s opening, the benefits have been experienced by landowners and new 
businesses replacing those who could not survive the years of construction in the area. 
The impact from shifting tunneling methods has been the subject of several lawsuits, 
including an initially successful class action that was sent back for a new trials by the 
BC Court of Appeal (Britten, 2020). Interestingly, TransLink’s management wanted to 
settle with Cambie merchants for $5 million, but the board overrode this decision and 
has forced years of litigation still ongoing. Even if TransLink is ultimately successful 
in court, the hard dealings with small business owners who have suffered significant 
loss as a result of the project has not improved TransLink’s image. Vancouver’s mayor 
between 2008 and 2018 categorized the handling of construction as “an injustice” 
(Wintonyk, 2012).
Another community impact as a consequence of geography is the further densifica-
tion and development of the Richmond suburb. The city core served by the Canada 
Line is set to triple in population from 40,000 in 2014 to 120,000 by 2031. While 
transit-oriented urbanism is typically desirable, Richmond is a silt island sitting 1 m 
above sea level, protected from flooding by a series of dikes. As Vancouver is a high-
risk earthquake zone, the island may partially liquefy in the event of an earthquake, or 
may be threatened more gradually by climate change. For these reasons the policy 
wisdom of encouraging population growth in this area has been questioned (Chan, 
2014). In response, Richmond has built and refined an extensive flood management 
plan which includes flood construction levels and strategic land raising, alongside 
investments in dikes and pump stations (City of Richmond, 2019).
Finally, controversy surrounded the working conditions of 40 Latin American 
laborers brought in by SNC for downtown tunnel boring under the federal 
Temporary Foreign Workers Program. The BC Human Rights Tribunal ruled that 
these workers were illegally discriminated against in wages, housing, and benefits 
relative to their European coworkers. The initial tribunal award of $2.5 million 
was replaced by an undisclosed settlement to preclude further litigation (CBC 
News, 2014). Had the construction phase been more closely managed by the pub-
lic sector, this situation may have been less likely or the use of temporary foreign 
workers avoided altogether.
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Land Use Impact
The economic impact of a rapid transit line can be in significant part seen through 
unlocking land value through easing access for people and firms. With the Canada 
Line, there has been significant positive impact on nearby real estate values. South of 
the Cambie Village retail corridor, the boulevard and adjacent neighborhoods were 
dominated by single-family homes, with a 1970s era shopping mall and a scattering of 
towers at 41st Avenue.
The Canada Line has driven real estate appreciation in two phases. First, during 
construction, an academic study estimated that single-family homes within 500 m of 
certain stations saw 50% greater appreciation from before the construction phase to 
2012 (Harlos, 2018). Even more significant movement was seen after the city up-
zoned the corridor to encourage density. Since this rezoning in 2011, almost the 
entirety of single-family home stock has been sold and assembled for multi-family 
residential construction. The first phase of assembly saw 10 single-family homes sell 
for $3.4 million each in 2011. Speculation has continued since, with a former gas sta-
tion going for $15 million in 2015 (O’Brien, 2015), and single-family home lots of 
10,000 square feet selling in the $12 million range as of 2017 and 2018 (Lee-Young, 
2017; Wright & DeCotiis, 2018). 
While Vancouver may need to densify in order to provide affordability within 
reasonable commutes to job clusters, the land speculation frenzy has necessitated 
luxury construction for developers to profit. Out of the 6,600 hundred new units 
approved in the Cambie Corridor as of 2015, 630 were rentals, while 480 were social 
housing (City of Vancouver, 2015).  A further $256 million in community amenity 
contributions were made from developers to the city (2015). However social housing 
and amenity requirements further pushed up price points, seeing much of the remain-
ing supply sold to Chinese investors (Lee-Young, 2015) at price points beyond the 
mortgage stress test threshold for even upper middle class incomes in the city. The 
land frenzy has prompted the city to tell developers that it will not allow similar 
luxury dominated outcomes as it contemplates the east-west Broadway SkyTrain 
extension (Fumano, 2019).
In terms of incremental assessed value generated by the Canada Line, it is difficult 
to both collect assessment records specific to the Cambie Corridor and Richmond city 
center, and isolate Canada Line driven growth from the significant real estate appre-
ciation seen in the region in the years following the Canada Line’s opening. For illus-
tration, the City of Vancouver alone saw roughly $300 billion in incremental assessed 
value created between the Canada Line’s 2009 opening and 2018. Roughly 1/8th of the 
city’s geography can be considered within a kilometer of the line. Although land val-
ues are obviously not constant throughout the city, the corridor accounting for 1/8th of 
assessments is conservative. If this roughly $40 billion in incremental value is 20% 
allocated to the Canada Line and 80% to other market factors, then $8 billion of Canada 
Line specific increment has been created in a decade. In terms of Vancouver tax mills 
(City of Vancouver, 2019), this $8 billion would equate to C$99 million in additional 
revenues per year. This is in addition to the community amenity contributions that may 
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have been otherwise able to be directed toward Canada Line construction as they 
clearly did not impede development feasibility.
Although the booming property market likely means that much of the Canada Line 
proximate activity would have likely occurred elsewhere in the city absent the line, 
meaning that the Canada Line specific revenue gain is probably much smaller than 
C$99 million per year, it does raise a value capture proposition. Namely that instead of 
grants from governments or finance from a private partner, a substantial share of the 
cost could have been covered through value capture or tax increment revenue bonds, 
with government grants serving as a backstop against underperformance. While BC 
does not have a tax increment financing (TIF) statute and there are significant limits 
on local government debt issues, the Vancouver Charter makes Vancouver the only 
local jurisdiction in the province that can issue its own bonds. In theory, these bonds 
could by bylaw be backed by incremental revenues of a transit value capture zone, but 
would require elector approval (Vancouver Charter, 1953, s. 242).
The City of Richmond however has used a form of value capture to fund a new sta-
tion at Capstan Way. Instead of relying upon incremental property taxes, Richmond 
has collected $8,500 per unit in a development area around the station. With construc-
tion on 16 towers and over 2,000 residential units exceeding timelines foreseen when 
the station agreement was closed in 2012, the new station reached full funding in 2018, 
9 years ahead of schedule, triggering a 30 month window for construction (Chan, 
2017a). More generally, the experience of up-zoning and appreciation with the Canada 
Line, combined with significant regional penetration of transit-oriented development 
and housing demand, demonstrate major potential for closing funding gaps for future 
rapid rail lines through value capture.
Discussion
Beyond the lost chance to leverage value capture finance, alternatives can be evaluated 
in two primary ways with the Canada Line project: the use of a private partner versus 
a traditional procurement model, and the allocation of funding priority for a northeast-
ern line instead of the north-south line to the airport.
With the former, once a final contract price was reached after major cost increases, 
the project was managed by the private sector without further price escalations for 
government. The downside however is the operational costs to return the private 
investment being far more expensive than publicly operated lines that were tradition-
ally procured. Had the private partner been able to keep to the bid budget, it would 
have profited significantly. From the government’s perspective, a primary factor in 
limiting cost reflected at the bid stage was the shift in tunneling method. Effectively 
this somewhat reduced the private partner’s overrun risk and allowed the public to 
lock in a cheaper bid, while externalizing the cost on Cambie Street retailers who 
would not necessarily benefit from increased property values associated with the fin-
ished product.
As for the issue of project investment, Canada Line ridership has exceeded expecta-
tions to the extent that early qualms have been silenced. Although the land speculation 
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induced by the Canada Line has resulted in housing weighted toward luxury product 
for those who do not earn their income locally, this is a planning problem at the city 
level. The Canada Line project itself allowed for significant densification in much 
closer proximity to job clusters than the northeastern line, which was more premised 
on shifting centers of employment to less valuable geography. With the northeastern 
Evergreen Line having entered operation in 2016, the early results have seen both 
inferior ridership (34,000 per day on a line roughly half as long; TransLink, 2018b) 
and lacking demand for office space components in transit-oriented developments.
Whereas many transit projects succumb to over-budget and late delivery with rider-
ship failing to meet projections, the Canada Line only experienced one of these issues. 
Even when the project went over-budget, the private partner was responsible for 
almost $700 million in cost overruns. The PPP model with protections against cost-
overruns was a necessity for the provincial government and Games boosters to sur-
mount opposition from the regional council wanting to fund previously agreed rapid 
transit priorities that had no Games utility. However, while skeptics on the regional 
council were won over due to legitimate concerns on initial capital overruns, they may 
not have fully considered the long term cost of the inflated yearly payments under the 
concession agreement relative to the cost of publicly run maintenance and operations 
already demonstrated on existing SkyTrain lines.
Further, the upside of the lucrative operational concession was obtained on the 
premise that capital cost risk could be shifted through to the private partner. To attract 
bids within the approved regional funding amount, private partners were allowed to 
use a cheaper tunneling method outside of downtown, which effectively externalized 
the cost to retail leaseholders on the construction route. Additionally, the private part-
ner was able to access a cheap foreign labour pool that would likely not be politically 
possible in a traditional public procurement.
The Canada Line was also a strong beneficiary of political will and financial capital 
made available by the Olympics. While in other host cities such political will to opti-
mize a place for a 2 week Games period has had wasteful, or sub-optimal results, the 
Canada Line has in some ways proven its critics wrong, albeit with missed opportuni-
ties. Although the Canada Line has spurred transformational transit-oriented develop-
ment and accompanying assessment gains for the cities in which it resides, the local 
government planning failure to ensure the densification adequately addressed the 
regional housing affordability crisis is a shortcoming to be learned from. Likewise, the 
line missed a window to leverage incremental property values to pay for the project 
that in part made the gains possible. However the incremental property value gener-
ated along with community amenity contributions from development, have instead 
created revenue windfall for the cities of Vancouver and Richmond.
Conclusion
Rapid rail transit projects are a frequent accompaniment to mega sporting events such 
as the Olympic Games. This class of projects is susceptible to the well-documented 
underperformance associated with both rapid rail transit and mega-events. The Canada 
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Line is one such project that provides an opportunity to add to each literature with 
more than 10 years of outcomes since the line’s opening and the Vancouver 2010 
Olympics. This article finds that while the PPP protected against capital cost overruns 
that are commonplace in mega-event mega-projects, there was significant additional 
cost to the public entrenched in the operational phase of the concession relative to the 
public option. Additionally, much of the initial cost certainty was obtained through 
changing to a more disruptive tunneling method that externalized a large part of the 
cost to commercial tenants along the line. Further, the significant gains in land value 
along the Canada Line corridor were a missed opportunity to leverage value capture 
and better tie the revenue benefit to the project cost. Still, despite shortcomings and 
lost opportunities, the Canada Line showed that sometimes the most desirable rapid 
transit project for Games use is also the best for medium and long term regional needs 
absent mega-event considerations.
Out of this paper, there are three particularly compelling avenues for future research. 
Most directly stemming from the Canada Line, the use of value capture from private 
ancillary real estate development to build future stations on existing lines is a concept 
that may be applicable to many cities. Similarly, the Canada Line highlights attributes 
that indicate potential for rezoning and densification to unlock land value which can 
finance a significant portion of the underlying rapid transit project. Can instances from 
other cities refine a model for the development of entire lines primarily or substan-
tially from value capture? If so, what does the finance structure look like? Likewise, 
for mega-events that frequently include major real estate developments for athletes’ 
villages connected by new rapid transit lines, is there potential for the infrastructure to 
be in significant part self-financing? With governments and mega-events similarly 
concerned with fiscal and financial sustainability, future work on these threads may be 
of great value.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, 
and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this 
article.
ORCID iD
Robert Sroka  https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6310-4016
References
Agha, N., Fairley, S., & Gibson, H. (2012). Considering legacy as a multi-dimensional con-
struct: The legacy of the Olympic Games. Sport Management Review, 15(1), 125–139.
Andranovich, G., & Burbank, M. J. (2011). Contextualizing Olympic legacies. Urban 
Geography, 32(6), 823–844.
16 Public Works Management & Policy 00(0)
Baade, R. A., & Matheson, V. A. (2016). Going for the Gold: The economics of the Olympics. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(2), 201–218.
Baker, D. M., & Lee, B. (2019). How does light rail transit (LRT) impact gentrification? 
Evidence from fourteen US urbanized areas. Journal of Planning Education and Research, 
39(1), 35–49.
Basolo, V. (2000). City spending on economic development versus affordable housing: Does 
inter-city competition or local politics drive decisions? Journal of Urban Affairs, 22(3), 
317–332.
Beuthe, M., Eeckhoudt, L., & Scannella, G. (2000). A practical multicriteria methodology for 
assessing risky public investments. Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, 34(2), 121–139.
Britten, L. (2020, May 14). TransLink wins appeal in long-running court battle over Canada 
Line impacts. CBC News. Retrieved February 26, 2021, from https://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/british-columbia/translink-canada-line-court-1.5570987
Canada Line Rapid Transit Inc. (2006). Canada Line final project report: Competitive selection 
phase. Retrieved March 8, 2021 from https://www.infrastructurebc.com/files-4/documents/
Canada-Line-Final-Project-Report_12April2006.pdf
CBC News. (2014, April 3). Canada Line foreign workers win wage settlement. Retrieved 
February 26, 2021, from https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/canada-line-
foreign-workers-win-wage-settlement-1.1327245
Cervero, R., & Kockelman, K. (1997). Travel demand and the 3Ds: Density, diversity, and 
design. Transportation Research. Part D, Transport and Environment, 2(3), 199–219.
Chan, K. (2014, August 14). Short platforms and trains: Is the SkyTrain Canada Line under-
built and near capacity? Daily Hive. Retrieved February 26, 2021, from https://dailyhive.
com/vancouver/short-platforms-trains-skytrain-canada-line-built-nearing-capacity 
Chan, K. (2016, May 13). Short platforms and trains: Is the SkyTrain Canada Line under-built 
and near capacity? Daily Hive. Retrieved February 26, 2021, from https://dailyhive.com/
vancouver/short-platforms-and-trains-is-the-skytrain-canada-line-under-built-and-nearing-
capacity
Chan, K. (2017a, November 16). TransLink to start designing Canada Line’s new $28 million 
Capstan Way Station. Daily Hive. Retrieved February 26, 2021, from https://dailyhive.
com/vancouver/capstan-way-station-canada-line-translink-richmond-2017
Chan, K. (2017b, December 31). TransLink 2017 – Part 5: Kevin Desmond says Canada Line 
is definitely under-built. Daily Hive. Retrieved February 26, 2021, from https://dailyhive.
com/vancouver/translink-2017-kevin-desmond-canada-line-built-skytrain
Chen, H., Rufolo, A., & Dueker, K. J. (1998). Measuring the impact of light rail systems on 
single-family home values: A hedonic approach with geographic information system appli-
cation. Transportation Research Record, 1617(1), 38–43.
City of Richmond. (2019). Flood protection management strategy 2019. Retrieved February 26, 
2021, from https://www.richmond.ca/__shared/assets/19_Flood_Protection_Management_
Strategy_CNCL_03251953137.pdf
City of Vancouver. (2015). Cambie corridor phase 3. Retrieved March 8, 2021, from https://
vancouver.ca/files/cov/cambie-corridor-phase-3-staff-presentation.pdf
City of Vancouver. (2019). Residential property tax rates. Retrieved February 26, 2021, from 
https://vancouver.ca/home-property-development/residential.aspx
Debrezion, G., Pels, E., & Rietveld, P. (2007). The impact of railway stations on residential 
and commercial property value: A meta-analysis. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and 
Economics, 35(2), 161–180.
Sroka 17
De Brucker, K., Macharis, C., & Verbeke, A. (2011). Multi-criteria analysis in transport project 
evaluation: An institutional approach. European Transport, 47(47), 3–24.
Ewing, R., & Cervero, R. (2010). Travel and the built environment: A meta-analysis. Journal of 
the American Planning Association, 76(3), 265–294.
Fallows, D. (2011, May 4). How to see the real China: Ride Beijing’s subway. The 
Atlantic. Retrieved February 26, 2021, from https://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2011/05/how-to-see-the-real-china-ride-beijings-subway/238360/
Flyvbjerg, B. (2007). Megaproject policy and planning: Problems, causes, cures. Summary of 
Dissertation for Higher Doctorate in Science (Dr. Scient.), Aalborg University.
Flyvbjerg, B., Bruzelius, N., & Rothengatter, W. (2003). Megaprojects and risk: An anatomy of 
ambition. Cambridge University Press.
Flyvbjerg, B., Garbuio, M., & Lovallo, D. (2009). Delusion and deception in large infrastruc-
ture projects: Two models for explaining and preventing executive disaster. California 
Management Review, 51(2), 170–194.
Flyvbjerg, B., Stewart, A., & Budzier, A. (2016). The Oxford Olympics study 2016: Cost and 
cost overrun at the games. Retrieved March 8, 2021, from https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/
papers/1607/1607.04484.pdf 
Fourie, J., & Santana-Gallego, M. (2011). The impact of mega-sport events on tourist arrivals. 
Tourism Management, 32(6), 1364–1370.
Fumano, D. (2019, April 26). Why city staff and council don’t want Broadway to be another 
Cambie. The Vancouver Sun. Retrieved February 26, 2021, from https://vancouversun.
com/news/local-news/dan-fumano-why-city-staff-and-council-dont-want-broadway-to-be-
another-cambie
Ginnell, K. J. (2013). Who really governs Vancouver? Community power and regime theory 
revisited (Doctoral dissertation). Arts & Social Sciences: Department of Political Science.
Gratton, C., Shibli, S., & Coleman, R. (2006). The economic impact of major sports events: A 
review of ten events in the UK. The Sociological Review, 54(2), 41–58.
Grix, J., & Lee, D. (2013). Soft power, sports mega-events and emerging states: The lure of the 
politics of attraction. Global Society, 27(4), 521–536.
Harlos, D. (2018). Land values and transit investment. Greenest City Scholars. Retrieved 
February 26, 2021, from https://sustain.ubc.ca/sites/sustain.ubc.ca/files/GCS/2018_GCS/
Reports/2018-55%20Land%20Values%20and%20Transit%20Investment%20-%20
Broadway%20Corridor_Harlos.pdf
Hatzopoulou, M., & Miller, E. J. (2009). Transport policy evaluation in metropolitan areas: 
The role of modelling in decision-making. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and 
Practice, 43(4), 323–338.
Hess, D. B., & Almeida, T. M. (2007). Impact of proximity to light rail rapid transit on station-
area property values in Buffalo, New York. Urban Studies, 44(5–6), 1041–1068.
Hodge, G., Greve, C., & Biygautane, M. (2018). Do PPP’s work? What and how have we been 
learning so far? Public Management Review, 20, 1105–1121.
International Paralympic Committee. (2014, October 11). Tokyo 1964: developing one of the 
world’s best transport systems. Retrieved February 26, 2021, from https://www.paralym-
pic.org/news/tokyo-1964-developing-one-world-s-best-transport-systems
Kaplanidou, K., & Karadakis, K. (2010). Understanding the legacies of a host Olympic city: 
The case of the 2010 Vancouver Olympic Games. Sport Marketing Quarterly, 19(2), 110.
Kidd, B. (2011). The legacies of the 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games in Vancouver. 
Framework of the International Olympic Committee’s OSC Postgraduate Grant Selection 
Committee.
18 Public Works Management & Policy 00(0)
Kilpatrick, J., Throupe, R., Carruthers, J., & Krause, A. (2007). The impact of transit corridors 
on residential property values. Journal of Real Estate Research, 29(3), 303–320.
Lee-Young, J. (2015, September 11). Real estate developers shrug as flood of Chinese cash 
into Vancouver continues. The Vancouver Sun. Retrieved March 8, 2021, from https://van-
couversun.com/business/real%20estate/real-estate-developers-shrug-as-flood-of-chinese-
cash-into-vancouver-continues
Lee-Young, J. (2017, August 17). $11-million ask: Cambie land assemblies send prices soar-
ing and the trend is spreading. The Vancouver Sun. Retrieved February 26, 2021, from 
https://vancouversun.com/business/local-business/11-m-ask-cambie-land-assemblies-
send-prices-soaring-and-the-trend-is-spreading
Lichfield, N. (2005). Community impact evaluation: Principles and practice. Routledge.
Logan, J. R., & Molotch, H. (1987). Urban fortunes: The political economy of place. University 
of California Press.
Loo, B. P., & Cheng, A. H. (2010). Are there useful yardsticks of population size and income 
level for building metro systems? Some worldwide evidence. Cities, 27(5), 299–306.
Maennig, W., & Zimbalist, A. S. (Eds.) (2012). International handbook on the economics of 
mega sporting events. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Matheson, V. (2012). Assessing the infrastructure impact of mega-events in emerging econo-
mies. College of the Holy Cross Working Papers. Retrieved March 8, 2021, from https://
crossworks.holycross.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://scholar.google.com/&httpsr
edir=1&article=1007&context=econ_working_papers
Muller, M. (2017). Approaching paradox: Loving and hating mega-events. Tourism 
Management, 63, 234–241.
O’Brien, F. (2015, March 23). This is what $15.8 million buys on Cambie Street. Western 
Investor. Retrieved March 8, 2021, from https://www.westerninvestor.com/news/british-
columbia/this-is-what-15-8-million-buys-on-cambie-street-1.2176344
Pan, Q., Pan, H., Zhang, M., & Zhong, B. (2014). Effects of rail transit on residential property 
values: Comparison study on the rail transit lines in Houston, Texas, and Shanghai, China. 
Transportation Research Record, 2453(1), 118–127.
Preuss, H. (2015). A framework for identifying the legacies of a mega sport event. Leisure 
Studies, 34(6), 643–664.
Sant, S. L., & Mason, D. S. (2015). Framing event legacy in a prospective host city: Managing 
Vancouver’s Olympic bid. Journal of Sport Management, 29(1), 42–56.
Savage, I. (1997). Scale economies in United States rail transit systems. Transportation 
Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 31(6), 459–473.
Siemiatycki, M. (2006). Implications of private-public partnerships on the development of 
urban public transit infrastructure: The case of Vancouver, Canada. Journal of Planning 
Education and Research, 26(2), 137–151.
Siemiatycki, M. (2011). Urban transportation public–private partnerships: Drivers of uneven 
development? Environment and Planning A, 43(7), 1707–1722.
Siemiatycki, M., & Friedman, J. (2012). The trade-offs of transferring demand risk on 
urban transit public–private partnerships. Public Works Management & Policy, 17(3), 
283–302.
Surborg, B., VanWynsberghe, R., & Wyly, E. (2008). Mapping the Olympic growth machine: 
Transnational urbanism and the growth machine diaspora. City, 12(3), 341–355.
Sussmann, C. (2006). Vancouver’s 2002 municipal election: Growth coalition defeated. Studies 
in Political Economy, 77(1), 157–174.
Sroka 19
Topalovic, P., Carter, J., Topalovic, M., & Krantzberg, G. (2012). Light rail transit in Hamilton: 
Health, environmental and economic impact analysis. Social Indicators Research, 108(2), 
329–350.
TransLink. (2014). 2014 statutory annual report. Retrieved February 26, 2021, from https://
www.scribd.com/document/268886907/Translink-2014-Annual-Report




TransLink. (2018a). Financial and performance report. Retrieved February 26, 2021, from 
https://www.translink.ca/-/media/translink/documents/about-translink/corporate-reports/
quarterly_reports/2018/year_end_2018_finance_and_performance_report.pdf
TransLink. (2018b). 2018 transit service performance review: SkyTrain and West Coast express 
summaries. Retrieved February 26, 2021, from https://public.tableau.com/profile/trans-
link#!/vizhome/2018TSPR-RailSummaries/TableofContents
Translink. (2020). 2019 annual statutory report. Retrieved February 26, 2021, from https://
www.translink.ca/-/media/translink/documents/about-translink/corporate-reports/statu-
tory_annual_report/2019-statutory-annual-report-with-appendix-a.pdf
Ustaoglu, E., Williams, B., & Murphy, E. (2016). Integrating CBA and land-use development 
scenarios: Evaluation of planned rail investments in the Greater Dublin Area, Ireland. Case 
Studies on Transport Policy, 4(2), 104–121.
Vancouver Charter. (1953). c. 55. Retrieved March 8, 2021, from https://www.bclaws.gov.
bc.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/vanch_00 
Wintony, D. (2012, May 18). The long and troubled road to the Canada Line. CTV News. 
Retrieved February 26, 2021, from https://bc.ctvnews.ca/the-long-and-troubled-road-to-
the-canada-line-1.426272
Whitson, D. (2004). Bringing the world to Canada: ‘The periphery of the centre’. Third World 
Quarterly, 25(7), 1215–1232.
Wright, C., & DeCotiis, M. (2018, May 18). Cambie Corridor land sold for nearly $4m above 
assessed value. Western Investor. Retrieved February 26, 2021, from https://www.west-
erninvestor.com/done-deals/cambie-corridor-land-sold-for-nearly-4m-above-assessed-
value-1.23307478
Zhong, H., & Li, W. (2016). Rail transit investment and property values: An old tale retold. 
Transport Policy, 51, 33–48.
Author Biography
Robert Sroka is a Lecturer in Sport Management at Northumbria University. He holds a PhD 
and LLM from the University of Michigan, as well as a JD and BA from the University of 
British Columbia. Robert is a lawyer in BC and Alberta, with a practice centered on local 
government.
